Opinion – Syrian humor after Assad

Humor is the art of telling the truth without hitting the edge of guilt. Examining what that limit is at any given time is precisely where the Comedian’s resource lies in communities, especially those living under the rule of the state (Billig 2005). The time of both the Assad regimes, father and son, Syrian comics have been doing that. For many years, Comic productions have imitated to the people of Syria what they already know; the absurd realities of everyday life that they have become accustomed to ignoring. By mimicking the familiar, humor allows people to re-examine their own realities by removing them from their lived experience.

However, thinking of comics as a tool for political protest is too simplistic, and for lack of a better word, pure. In Assad’s Syria, Humor was a vehicle for unpopular criticism, and a stable force that perpetuated the regime’s ideology (Wedeen 2013). In occupying both poles, the comedic subgenre of Syrian drama created an entire platform where the mimetic display of a subversive, cautious, and intellectual public sphere was paradoxically evident.

Over the years, Syrian drama has produced thousands of comedy productions that deal directly with the harsh realities of life in Syria. By using influence chain diagrams as Mary (Mirrors), viewers will be exposed to a dramatized version that reminds them of the limitations of their nationality. In that regard, Syrian humor was clearly a moral institution. Most notable, however, was the role of Syrian humor in exposing the complicity of ordinary citizens themselves in co-producing the absurdities of Syrian life. In that way, it reduces the effectiveness of Comedy as a tool of political protest against the regime and doubles it, instead, as a collective acknowledgment of the citizens themselves about their role in being Syria.

Having worked under both Assad regimes, the Syrian media industry has shown a remarkable understanding of politics in which it can still produce creativity. Although for many, Hafiz Al Assad and Bashar Al Assad were unbroken versions of the same regime, these two regimes, although not a couple, were markedly different in the type of life created for the common Syrian. For example, Hafiz’s regime was more specific in communicating the boundaries of his citizenry than his son (Wedeen 2013). Empowered with disciplinary power in his humanist religion, he would draw a hard line between what was acceptable and what was not (Wedeen 2013).

At that time, Bashar initially presented a gentle, benevolent image, which sold aspirational freedom as part of his new ideals of the good life (Wedeen 2013). This idea of ​​a good life was a lot of free and very independent policies, got Syria the label neoliberal autocracy (Wedeen 2013). The problem with this synthesis of neoliberalism and authoritarianism was that it produced a gray model that challenged Hafiz’s black-and-white Syrian political thought. Bashar had abandoned the line Hafiz left behind. This created a real problem for a media industry that not only didn’t know where the lines were, but also lacked the political vocabulary to capture the new, complex, and compellingly liberal Syria. If comedy symbolizes forbidden knowledge as the strict comic books say, then the nature of Syrian Comedy shows that forbidden knowledge was more accessible in Hafiz’s Syria than in Bashar’s.

Under Hafiz, little guesswork was required for the Comedians to know where the red lines really were. For example, the use of dialects such as Druze or Alawi dialects should not be used in television productions, and will be limited to theater only (Dick 2007). Meanwhile, under Bashar, the serials are similar To stand out (Boqa’a Daou) again The Forgotten Village’s (Dayaa Dayaa) the entire punchline was often predicated on the professional use of these dialects, which were understood as direct references to the context of the Alawi regime (Dick 2007). Most of the actors subject to the program’s ridicule were also based in a non-urban area, and sometimes in Latakia itself – the Assads’ own state of origin – which strengthens the indication of the state’s base even more (Dick 2007).

Additionally, under Hafiz, most of the skits were limited to bringing political criticism to the middle levels of the state, never directly addressing the pillars of power (Dick 2007). Under Bashar, however, the position of director-general (moder ‘am) eventually fell to include members of the security establishment, intelligence agencies, ministers, and political analysts themselves. This collapse of the old ceiling was a direct result of Bashar’s new talk of a new Syria, where freedom can be desired, by those who behave as “good citizens”. Soon, comics explaining what it means to be a good citizen became the backbone of Syrian cartoons that almost emphasized the social construction of a corrupt Syrian.

The emphasis on everyone’s role in co-managing Syria’s life makes everyone human. By making a comic drama, it presented a debate on behalf of all the political presence in Syria. This included the wickedness of the wicked, the discord of the dishonest, and the actions of the evildoers. Indeed, a remarkable achievement. However, in doing so, it also creates a negative appreciation of the services of the state in reducing the power of citizens deprived of morality, reinforcing the uncertainty of freedom that can arise from sharing freedom with citizens as lacking ‘goodness’ as fellow citizens are presented to be.

From 2011 to 2024, the price of political comics increased, driving, in most cases (but not all) underground productions (Noderer 2020). Pro-revolution comedians used political humor to dethrone their leader (Noderer 2020). They did so by crossing the line into direct insults to the leader’s person, including his physical characteristics (Noderer 2020). The texts were no longer hidden, multi-layered or open to interpretation. Meanwhile, during this same period, the Syrian media continued to work in a back-and-forth relationship with the inspectors in releasing skits that were still critical of everyone during the war.

For many, the level of tolerance the government has for comedians is a reflection of his life. The Assad years have produced rich content that provides deep insight into the lives of both Syrians. What remains to be seen is how the new Syrian government, with its transition and consolidation, will respond to Political Jokes? Will the Syrian opposition who have been producing jokes for years agree to be a laughing stock now? Will civil society organizations continue to accept their role as part of Syria’s transition? Whatever the answers, it is worth celebrating the end of an era of wonderful Syrian comedy produced within a context of discomfort.

References

Billig, Michael. 2005. Laughter and Ridicule: Toward a Social Criticism of Humor.