Perspective – Germany, Europe and the Possible Consequences of the War in Ukraine

The war in Ukraine deeply affects the future of Germany and Europe. But one thing is certain: there will be a next day. Since war has a tendency to escalate excessively, it must be contained in politics with the aim of ending it immediately and preventing it in the future. This is especially important when, as in the case of the war in Ukraine, nuclear power is directly and indirectly involved. Therefore, after three years of hard fighting, it is reasonable to consider the possible consequences of the war and the dangers, and its consequences for Germany and Europe. I can think of three possible scenarios: 1. Russia wins the war. 2. Ukraine wins the war. 3. No one wins and the conflict remains unstable. The first scenario is unlikely but poses a serious risk to Germany and Europe. The second scenario is less likely to be the same but is associated with greater risk due to the use of tactical nuclear weapons. The third scenario is more likely and represents a relatively low, yet reasonable, risk. Considering each of these situations, we can reach the following conclusions:

First, Germany – without messing with the method used so far – various options for security policy depending on the outcome of the war in Ukraine: 1. The termination of the EU’s fully integrated defense organization, economic and financial. 2. The assumption of the role of quasi-hegemonic leadership as the main sword of the American continent in Europe. 3. The assumption of a strong role of nationalism in Europe. 4. The creation of a European Caucus within NATO and a joint security policy cooperation between NATO and the EU. In fact it would not take the Ukrainian war to use these options one way or the other. However, until now, the political will and the corresponding framework conditions have been lacking. The war in Ukraine and its consequences can reveal both. However, since we are facing an emergency election which is already on 23 February 2025, most of the political parties involved are not clearly arguing in favor of one of these options. They still choose the mud path. The only exception is the far-right AFD (Alternative for Germany) which wants to leave NATO and the EU and end sanctions against Russia. While the AFD is clearly fighting for a third choice, the Social Democrats lean heavily towards the fourth, the Greens towards the first and the Christian Democrats into the second.

Second, the outcome of the war in Ukraine will have a major impact on the security of Germany and Europe. The possibility of a Russian victory would pose a serious security risk to Germany and Europe and would have far-reaching consequences for Ukraine and the stability of the continent. Therefore, it should be completely banned. A victory for Ukraine may be desirable, but it is associated with a high risk of nuclear escalation, which could lead to the destruction of Ukraine, or even Europe. Astalemate may result in a new “Cold War”, which may, at best, be transformed into a “Cold Peace” through non-violent inter-systemic competition. At worst, it would mean permanent discord and the threat of war in the sense of an ongoing struggle for proper order.

Third, there are three common truths when it comes to European security: The first is that Russia remains an ideal Eastern European neighbor of Germany and the EU in terms of geography and power. Another common truth is that the USA will remain a key player in European security for the foreseeable future, and even in Donald Trump’s second term. Germany and Europe therefore have an interest in the appropriate involvement of the US and Europe. The third common fact is that China is playing an important role in this conflict. In the event of a Russian victory, China would feel encouraged to use force to achieve its goals in relation to Taiwan. A Russian defeat would jeopardize Chinese ambitions and allow the US to focus on Beijing. This is why China does not care about a defeated Russia. The intensification of the war in Ukraine, leading to a sustained war, will bind the US and Europe and make Beijing play the role of a mediator, which will increase its influence in Europe and Russia.

Fourth, regardless of the situation, Berlin will have to spend more on its own and the EU’s defense. When the US involvement in Europe decreases, the defense responsibility of Germany and Europe will be greater. In the current election campaign the parties from the political center are competing with tough declarations about high defense costs ranging from “more than two percent” of GDP (Christian Democrats, Social Democrats) to three percent (Christian Social Union) to 3.5 percent (Greens) . In addition, Germany’s share of the cost of supporting Ukraine is likely to increase even though it is already Europe’s largest supporter in terms of total bilateral contributions. At the same time, Berlin must advance the European integration project and contribute to economic and political stability in Eastern Europe. This is expected to lead to an increase in national budget disputes and social tensions in Germany that could favor extremist groups. In order to reduce such conflicts, the possibility of peaceful coexistence with imperialist Russia should be explored.

Since a victorious peace is not possible for any of the characters and the costs of the war are increasing not only for the opponents of the war but also for their supporters and an incalculable number of states that live outside, Berlin must fight for a place to live on the lines of the third state. This includes a territorial compromise that is acceptable to both those who oppose the preservation of the official position of Ukraine and postpones the final solution to the future. Although they are staunch supporters of Ukraine’s victory, the parties of the political center have begun to see new realities, however, they have not reached the right conclusions. Groups from the extreme left and right spectrum are already arguing for a third state but they have a negative view of both the pillars of European stability, NATO und EU, and an empty view of the aggressor Russia.

Germany should know that the bon mot mentioned by the first Secretary General of NATO, King Hastings Ismay, still works in a modified form: NATO exists to keep the Russians out, the Americans and the Germans involved (instead of “down”, as in the first quote). It continues to be in Germany’s interest to work to restore the Harmel formula of 1967, according to which an adequate defense capability and detente can enable security among the system’s rivals. After all, Russia will not end on the scene and will one day be interested in cooperation. Finally, Berlin must be careful not to grow into a larger role over time because this may attract conflict and the formation of counter-alliances. This means staying involved in the European project and investing in European integration more than ever.

Further Studies in E-International Relations