Marta Migliorati is a lecturer at the University of Malta. His research and teaching interests include European integration, high politics in the EU and other multi-level systems, regulatory oversight, EU immigration and asylum policies, and EU external affairs. In 2025, he will join ETH Zürich to contribute to the SNSF-DFG project “IMPLEMENT.EU.” Marta’s recent publications have appeared in leading academic journals, including the Journal of European Public Policy, European Union Politics, Regulation and Governance, and Comparative Political Studies. His recent publications include “Concepts and measures of bureaucratic limitations in European Union legislation from hand-writing to machine learning”, “Different participation, common processes: EU agencies in direct policy implementation”, and “New Nordic Approaches ?Explaining the defense policy choices of the Nordic countries after the war in Ukraine”.
Where do you see the most exciting research/debates happening in your field?
Interesting things happen in a way. Analyzing large sets of data is becoming easier (and/or faster) thanks to machine learning and AI. For example, some colleagues from the University of Milano and I have analyzed thousands of EU legal acts to find out the tasks assigned to the EU and national actors and the relationship between them. It took a long time to design, train and validate the machine learning model, but now it works very well, and we can confirm our previous research on a much wider scale. Title-wise, a lot has changed as well. Geopolitics, first of all, has always been present in academic discussions, but also the return of protectionism and the crisis of Western democratic systems. All exciting topics, if only they did not reflect the dire state of international relations today. Another topic that interests me personally, perhaps because of current policy and technological developments, is technology and how this is used by policy makers as a way to control and/or empower citizens.
How has your understanding of the world changed over time, and what (or who) caused the most significant changes in your thinking?
I’d say I’ve become more pragmatic (or less opinionated?) than before, and I’m more critical of certain political actions and behaviors. When I entered the field of European politics I was driven by a great passion for the European mission, I thought it was just amazing. But when I began to study it more deeply, I saw many errors and contradictions at its core. Finally I realized that in Western Europe, we tend to grow up with ideas of what values are ‘good’ and rely on the special power of our institutions to maintain them. Over time I understood that, to borrow the words of Ian Manners, there is no real “normal” in international relations, and being normal does not mean “good”. The EU has been promoting itself with the rhetoric of protecting democracy and human rights which is now disappearing in the face of its (e) actions (think of migration and asylum policy, think of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East), and I believe that the EU may end up paying a high price for this, in the medium and long term.
In 2022, Denmark decided in a referendum to commit to the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). What are the key domestic factors that have allowed this change to gain public and political support?
In two articles published in JEPP, I discussed how Danish citizens are often resistant to the EU expanding its sovereignty, unlike their political leaders, who were prepared to join the CSDP long before 2022. What changed at home, was public opinion – the Ukraine crisis became more important in scale and immediacy than any other conflict since Denmark’s 1993 exit. In the last two years, elites have seen an opportunity and used the broader context of the country and the increased perception of collective security needs within Europe to focus on the CSDP in society, and win their bet this time. Unlike in 2015, when the same Justice and Home Affairs referendum failed, the crisis in Ukraine really changed public sentiment and priorities.
How has the war in Ukraine affected the EU’s approach to integration, especially in areas such as defence, energy security and foreign policy?
Diversified integration (DI) means many things, but in its traditional sense, it refers to the non-standard application of EU law. After Brexit happened, and Denmark stopped opting out of the CSDP, several accounts argue that this type of DI is declining, and I agree– there is not much left to distinguish! However, this may change if the EU, in response to the conflict in Ukraine, continues to renew its commitment to enlargement to the point where new countries actually join (see recent developments in Moldova)—as DI often happens when new countries join the bloc. Also, we can expect new divisions to occur in the field of immigration and asylum when the Schengen regime is questioned by founding members such as the Netherlands and Germany (although this may be more related to the conflicts in the Middle East and migration situations around the world than just Ukraine).
In terms of defense and foreign policy, it is difficult to predict, since the field is still intergovernmental and therefore, by definition, fragmented-in many initiatives, each state cooperates in the way and to the extent it chooses. Perhaps we will indeed see less of a difference than before when policy becomes more powerful—we never had a Defense Commissioner before the newly assembled Commission. That also depends on what happens in Ukraine and NATO after Trump’s re-election.
In yours the subject he highlights both the long-term defensive styles and the immediate responses to the war in Ukraine. Do you see these changes in Nordic defense policy as reactive, or indicative of deeper structural changes?
From my analysis, it seems that the Nordic countries have had slow but steady changes since they joined the EU, although these changes were not always visible in their societies. Especially in Sweden, net neutrality is a national identity and seeing it officially disappear has been a big change for people. This gradual change was driven by changing security priorities, NATO’s evolving role in western Europe, and external pressures such as Russia’s foreign policy since 2014. Ultimately, informal participation in NATO programs laid the groundwork for joining the alliance. Structurally, the changes can be deeper and wider now, as they have devoted more resources to defense and NATO activities than before – but then again, many European countries that were already in NATO have done the same in the last few years to meet at least the 2% target.
What will be the long-term security consequences for the Nordic region following these changes in defense policy? Are there any particular challenges or opportunities you foresee?
Another important impact is the increase in military cooperation and cooperation between the Nordic states – for example Sweden has taken the task of leading the establishment of NATO ground forces in Finland to strengthen its defense against Russia. Challenges may include addressing rising military spending in both states to achieve a high defense capability. And of course increasing military power in the region could create more tensions with Russia on the border (and Finland shares a very long border with Russia!). Finland has recently condemned cyber espionage from Russia, and accused the Kremlin of deliberately sending migrants and asylum seekers across the border.
What can the Nordic countries do to effectively prevent Russia from pursuing further expansionist policies.
Honestly, I don’t know what they could do beyond what they are doing. Joining NATO was already a strong signal from the two Nordics, accompanied by additional measures including deeper military cooperation, higher costs, investment in more advanced cyber security systems, participation in the EU regime …
In your work in the European Parliament and on free trade agreements, you highlight the rise of politics. How do you see this impacting the EU’s global trade relations?
Right now global trade relations are critical—from the EU and China clashing over electric cars to Mr. Trump saying that “cost” is “the best word in the dictionary”, it seems that we are entering an era where the debate between protectionism and free trade is taking place. increasingly polarized. This separation may have an impact on the EU’s trade relations with key partners, which may sever ties with other dependent economies or cause shifts in procurement strategies in key sectors. On the EU side, it seems that the new Commission’s approach will be more protective than before, and not everyone supports this approach, from large industries such as Saab, and EU member states such as Germany and Hungary.
What is the most important piece of advice you would give to young International Relations scholars?
With the vast amount of data now accessible for analysis, it is more important than ever to have a comprehensive understanding of the discipline, balancing both applied and theoretical knowledge. I would recommend starting with “digging” into the empirics to get an idea of what’s going on, but without forgetting how useful theory may (or may not) be to explain what the data suggest. Empirical research requires data and benefits from inductive methods, but it can be problematic if we switch to a completely data-driven approach and lose touch with the scientific effort to understand the causes of events.
Collaboration is also important, especially for young students. Academia can be very competitive, and research can sometimes feel isolated—but in my experience, the best ideas often come from collaborative work. It encourages broad thinking, constructive criticism, and ultimately learning, providing insights into writing, reading, and critical academic navigation. Ultimately, the scholars I work with have become my wisest and dearest friends. Self-publishing is satisfying, but co-writing can bring real joy.
Further Studies in E-International Relations
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