Dr Precious Chatterje-Doody is a Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Studies at the Open University, is an Officer of the School of Higher Education, and a member of the UK Young Academy. His research focuses on the relationship between communication, identity, identity, and security, with a particular focus on Russia, disinformation, and military violence. His new book he wrote, Russia, Disinformation and the Liberal Order: RT as populist pariah (Cornell University Press, 2024) is now available in Open Access.
Where do you see the most exciting research/debates happening in your field?
For me, the most exciting IR work always happens at the intersections of IR and other fields. It’s a remarkably flexible and scalable discipline, and I think this is a good thing. One of the most important areas of inquiry in international relations at the moment relates to how individuals and other political actors operate within a globally coordinated real-time media environment. Our daily processes, perceptions, and cognitions are increasingly shaped by implicit algorithmic factors that may influence our emotions and behavior. What implications does this new reality have for debates about structure and agency? How can we separate the decisions we make about how we use online platforms from platform-based structures and the shaping we get from them? How do our online interactions connect with our offline behaviors and decisions? What is the political economy of these changes? These are just a few examples of the kind of questions we need multidisciplinary collaboration to make sense of in contemporary international relations.
How has your understanding of the world changed over time, and what (or who) caused the most significant changes in your thinking?
I consider myself a creative professional, and I’m very fortunate to find inspiration from a wide range of interesting and experienced writers that I’ve worked with in all different fields. For me, the back-and-forth of collaborative writing is a wonderful way to bring together ideas and concepts that you may not find accurate, but which can greatly enrich your scholarship. I believe that, in many cases, if IR scholarship does not speak to all disciplines, it is likely missing a large part of the picture.
How would you define ‘geopolitical culture jamming,’ and how does it differ from other forms of satire or cultural jamming?
Geopolitical culture jamming is a tactic used by non-Western international broadcasters to criticize and destroy the culture of the region they are talking about, but using the culture of that region. It goes beyond pure satire because it involves deliberately blurring the line between stories and jokes. It also differs from cultural communication, which emerged from arts-based activism as a means of subverting dominant messages and encouraging critical thinking. By interfering with the political culture, these broadcasters use the culture of the country they are talking about to destroy the dominant foreign policy discourses and discourage any meaningful engagement with them. If anything, it encouraged apathy rather than engagement.
How does ICYMI’s (Internet acronym for ‘in case you missed it’) use of geopolitical culture jamming speaks to a broader trend in how media interact with global geopolitics, especially in an era of increasing disinformation and media fragmentation?
ICYMI was a series of humorous online video shorts produced in English by the Russian international broadcaster, Russia Today (RT). In it, an attractive female presenter with a British accent and an Anglicised Russian name delivered a snarky tidbit about international affairs, accompanied by green screen footage and snapshots of photos, videos, emojis, and the like.
The producers saw the series as an easy way to make fun of politics in general, showing their political leanings. Overall, however, the series echoes RT’s favorite talking points about a hypocritical and decadent West, while also softening and downplaying Russia’s major provocations like the Salisbury poison. The important thing is that all this is done with a nod and a wink. Funny ‘questions’ were asked over the top, and the product looked crisp but there were no real questions going on.
ICYMI’s geopolitical culture jamming fits well with the contemporary media ecosystem where people rarely have the patience to stick to a particular program but will enjoy short, sharp, shareable media products that make them feel like they’re playing a joke. It never had a huge audience, but it was a great example of how you can package accessible media to make it look like it’s saying something deep when the content that matters is actually very little. Very much a sign of the times.
He argues that biased information is effective not because it is true, but because it sounds believable to the audience. What role does the media environment (both traditional and youth media) play in increasing or decreasing the effectiveness of false narratives?
One of the most striking features of today’s media environment is that what determines how far and fast media content spreads is not credibility, believability, or quality – just whether it’s interesting enough to hold our attention or evoke strong emotions. But these are also the factors that make disinformation work – when it draws us into a compelling story or when it evokes a visceral reaction, so people don’t want to check if it’s really true. But the second part of this is that the more we see this type of content – and the more people seem to support it by interacting with it, the more believable it seems.
This multifaceted problem goes beyond pure disinformation and relates to the nature of the type of content that is algorithmically pushed to us as media users. It can vary greatly by platform, but even so, when the content makes enough splashes, it migrates in some way to all platforms, giving rise to its own types of derivative products that take us away from important content that can be proven true or false. Instead, we find a lot of unusual content that develops subjective feelings about it rather than informed opinions.
He argues that the humorous content of Russia Today (RT) is not only about promoting Russia’s foreign policy but about drawing attention to global political imbalances. What is the broader impact of this type of media on international perceptions of Russia?
There is a rapidly growing body of scholarship across IR and political communication that looks at the power of humor and satire to influence world affairs. Since people’s feelings about the experiences they often encounter last longer than their memories of the actual experiences they encountered, humor has the potential to shape people’s perception of international actors in the long term. Thus, while a humorous narrative may not change a person’s opinion on a particular topic, it can simultaneously reinforce people’s preconceived notions about inequality within liberal democracies and make them feel less concerned about their ability to change this. That lays the groundwork for thinking “Well, maybe Russia has a point” about certain aspects of international politics, reducing people’s natural resistance to some of the false narratives we’ve seen spread by the Russian regime in recent years.
Do you see RT’s promotion of conspiracy theories as a deliberate strategy, or is it a product of its media and communication tactics?
RT’s promotion of conspiracy theories is certainly a deliberate strategy, but it does not stand alone–it is consistent with RT’s wider international media environment, which it learned in part from the closeness of populist right-wing media outlets. It is important not to forget that conspiracy theories are a particular way of looking at the world that has often proved popular throughout history. This worldview focuses on the power differential between the elite and the common people, so it is easy to prioritize the important issues of the day in any area. In the case of RT, there is usually no need to invent conspiracy theories as there are plenty of them already circulating all over the world’s media. RT is particularly adept at tailoring it to its own purposes – tapping into public opinion, fear and anxiety in ways that fit the Kremlin’s preferred narrative of the international order.
Given the success of Russian media operations outside the West, what recommendations would you make to combat Russian influence in these regions?
One of the biggest difficulties in resisting Russian influence outside the West is the way in which it has been constructed in Soviet history to present itself as an opposition to Western (neo-) imperialism. In fact, Russia’s approach to international relations is very imperial in nature, and it would be wise to do more in this regard. In the case of the war in Ukraine, for example, Russia likes to pretend that it is a proxy conflict where Russia defends its interests against the Western shilling supported by NATO. But, Ukraine is an independent country with a proud history of resisting Russian imperialism – post-colonial countries have more in common with Russia. This is an important similarity to emphasize.
How do you see the role of public service broadcasters emerging over the next decade, especially in light of increasing media fragmentation, digital influencers, and growing distrust of mainstream media?
For me, public service broadcasters have never been more important, even though their position is under attack more than ever. At one time, they could rely on their reputation to cultivate a base of public trust, and to some extent that remains true of important news stories – for example, when it comes to COVID-19, many people turn to the BBC as trustworthy. source of information where there is a lot of speculation and false reporting going on. But at the same time, reliance on so-called ‘legacy media’ has long declined, and some people lump public service broadcasters into that category. Reaching out to these people is not just about providing reliable information. It’s about providing reliable information about things that matter to them. People shift their attention elsewhere when they feel unseen or unheard. Therefore, in the next decade, it will be important for public service broadcasters to present topics that concern their audience, on their own terms – without the terms of debate dictated by the mainstream media. If they can do this, they will be in a strong position to provide the broad educational content that is key to the mission of public service broadcasters.
What is the most important piece of advice you would give to young International Relations scholars?
Set your horizons as wide as possible! Pretty much everything is international relations in one way or another, so you should never limit your research topics based on what academic guards think are appropriate disciplinary topics. Go down those rabbit holes, and use the IR skills you’ve learned to get through them. I would say this is the best advice for life in general!
Further Studies in E-International Relations
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