In late 2016, as his presidency drew to a close, Barack Obama took one last trip to Berlin. At a private dinner, he urged his longtime partner, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, to shepherd her international legacy — and the broader transatlantic alliance of liberal democrats — through the apparent turmoil of a Trump presidency. Against the backdrop of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and incursion into Donbas, Britain’s vote to leave the European Union, and populist unrest across the continent, Merkel’s Germany looked like the last bastion of political stability: It was a very populous country. in the EU, the fourth largest economy in the world, a stable democracy, and a proven leader of many nations. With 12 years in the job, the Chancellor had more experience of government than any of his peers in the EU. In 2015, Time magazine rightly named him not just person of the year, but “Chancellor of the Free World.”
Although she was uncomfortable with the title, Merkel reluctantly accepted the job. Although many Western leaders were fighting for Trump’s popularity, he offered him “close cooperation,” but apparently on the basis of shared basic values such as democracy, freedom, respect for the law and human dignity. He worked with Trump because – as he said later – “any German chancellor is very interested … to work and talk with any American President.” But he refused to conform to his style of political bargaining. Offering a counter model to Trump’s actions, Merkel saw the intrinsic importance of alliances and cooperation, working to preserve them even in the face of strong opposition or destruction from Washington: Therefore, she was able to keep the Iran nuclear agreement (Joint Comprehensive). Plan of Action, JCOPA) floated after Washington’s withdrawal. He held the EU together despite Trump’s attempts to play divide-and-rule. Controversially, he also defended Germany’s questionable economic ties with Russia and China against growing criticism.
Throughout the Trump years, Germany’s international leadership was more popular in the world than America’s. However, at home, the Germans remain very reluctant to take a leading role. As soon as Trump left, Merkel thus returned the baton of leadership to Washington. Commenting on the occasion, President Biden thanked him for “an exemplary life of German service and, I can add – and I mean that from the bottom of my heart – to the world.” Biden was able to quickly undo some of the damage done by Trump: He rejoined the Paris agreement on climate change, strengthened the transatlantic alliance, and breathed new life into seemingly vague formats like the Transatlantic Quad. Before long, these will be important tools for the American leadership in planning the West’s response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.
Even so, Biden has not been able to fully reverse the causes and effects of Trump’s policies: Whether it will appear gradually, intermittently, or suddenly, Trump’s return to the White House signals a broader change in America. international role: Already, the incoming President is busy undermining long-term relations, threatening to ignore alliance commitments, vowing to withdraw US support for Ukraine, and referring to the annexation of a NATO partner. Just as the West faces the biggest threat to its freedom and security in decades, its traditional leader appears to be going AWOL.
If they are to meet the challenge presented by an aggressive Russia and a strong China, Europeans – and liberal democracies around the world – will have to step up. Once again, “the world that America made” (Kagan) needs a guardian. Unlike Trump’s first term, however, the coming one may not just be an interregnum, but the beginning of the end of “liberal hegemony” (Ikenberry). Most structures throughout the liberal world seem to be moving from liberal internationalism to nativist isolationism. Returning to international liberal standards in four years is not a given. And the person who will be able to lead the West in this time of change is sadly lost.
Eight years after Obama dined with Merkel, Joe Biden, too, headed to Berlin. Observers testify to his strong working relationship with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz: In 2023, Biden gave Scholz political cover for his controversial decision to send large-scale battle tanks to Ukraine. The Chancellor returned the favor when he agreed to release a convicted murderer in Russia in exchange for the extradition of American political prisoners. However, unlike Merkel, Scholz lacks both a parliamentary majority and the trust of key European partners. His country, moreover, is facing a severe economic downturn, its infrastructure is crumbling, and its military is unprepared to fight a major war. Whether Scholz’s successor – Friedrich Merz of the Christian Democratic CDU – will fare better remains to be seen. He will likely invest in repairing Europe’s most important relations and perhaps prove a staunch supporter of Ukraine, but he, too, will be hampered by the consequences of Germany’s economic dependence on China, misguided energy policy, and decades of neglect. soldiers. Furthermore, his party’s almost religious adherence to the so-called ‘debt brake’ will effectively prevent him from borrowing the money needed to underwrite any credible leadership role.
In other Western capitals, the situation looks equally bleak: In France, President Macron has stripped himself of a majority in parliament. UK’s Keir Starmer failed to capitalize on his election victory. Donald Tusk’s position in Poland was damaged by the illegitimate legacy of the previous government. Italy’s Giorgio Meloni also flirts with fascism. Mark Rutte of NATO and Ursula von der Leyen of the EU both lack the political independence and material strength to act as effective leaders. At the moment, therefore, it seems that no single country or organization can fill America. Sadly, on his farewell trip to Berlin, Biden did not meet the German Chancellor alone, but also all three leaders of the Transatlantic Quad, namely Scholz, Macron, and Starmer. But while Biden has used this format successfully in the past, Poland’s enthusiastic reaction to its exclusion from the Berlin meeting has negated its value as a means of communication. In any case, Trump can be expected to return to his previous habit of ignoring the format.
Perhaps the most promising is the new E-5 format that includes France, Germany, Poland, Italy and Great Britain, which recently met at the level of defense ministers in Berlin. In a subsequent statement, the five said they are “willing to develop ideas and lead the way to advance Europe’s defense readiness.” The foreign ministers of the five countries then met in the same situation as their Spanish counterpart, stating their willingness to “think and do more about European security”. The leader of the German opposition, Friedrich Merz, has proposed yet another format – a contact group made up of Germany, France, Great Britain, and Poland to make proposals for a post-war European order. Indeed, there is no shortage of “small” European initiatives vying for leadership in a post-Biden Europe. A few weeks before the inauguration of Donald Trump, this seemingly incoherent cacophony testifies to a worrying lack of clarity in Europe about how to deal with the emerging leadership vacuum. Options are there, but a decision needs to be made.
In order for it to happen, any institutional arrangement that will guide the free world through a period of continued uncertainty, must be protected from nationalistic and populist tendencies not only in the United States, but throughout the Western world. This can be effectively ensured in a cooperative way, not dependent on a single actor and his political position, but underwritten by a group of several key players who are both interested and able to maintain the order of freedom. These measures will be met directly by the E-5 group, which includes the five countries with the highest defense costs in Europe and five of the seven largest economies of the continent. It focuses on a possible renewed Franco-German axis, binds the UK to European institutions, installs Poland as a proxy for Central and Eastern Europe, and allows Meloni’s Italy to act as a possible mediator with Trump.
The ultimate success of this setup depends on the readiness of the existing members to act not only in their own interests, but also in the wider European spirit. In Germany in particular, this will involve potentially challenging financial and political choices. Whether the country’s new government will be ready to do it, as Angela Merkel does from time to time, remains to be seen. The exception, however, will be more expensive and last longer.
Further Studies in E-International Relations
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