Dr. Karsten Friis is a Research Professor at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. His area of research is security and defense policy in Europe, with an emphasis on NATO, the Nordic region, the Arctic, and transatlantic relations. He is a political scientist with a PhD from the University of Groningen, Cand.polit. from the University of Oslo and an MSc from the London School of Economics. Friis has been associated with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) since 2007. Prior to that, he was a political advisor to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) mission to Serbia (2004 to 2007), OSCE. in Montenegro (2001) and Kosovo (1999). In addition, Friis served for several years in the Norwegian Army and served in NATO/The Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo. He also regularly comments on public discourse – not least in relation to the war between Russia and Ukraine. His recent publications include: ‘Securing Northern Europe: new opportunities, key challenges’, ‘Renewing Nordic Security and Defense Cooperation‘,’Even as the war continues, NATO should open the door to defense cooperation with Ukraine‘and’Rethink the landscape: How Ukraine can redefine victory‘.
Where do you see the most exciting research/debates happening in your field?
Debates related to dramatic changes in the world, about security and energy transitions, i.e. evidence-based debates are the most interesting. Theoretical debates struggle to keep pace, which is not surprising given the changing world. Therefore, questions related to global governance, new structures (from “shadow ships” to BRICS), war and security (DPRK troops in Europe), new threats and technologies, – all these topics challenge our usual views on world politics .
How has your understanding of the world changed over time, and what (or who) caused the most significant changes in your thinking?
When the world changes, so does our attention. I worked for many years in international operations, COIN, comprehensive approach, peacekeeping etc., but when full-scale war broke out in Europe, my focus changed again. No one is talking about R2P anymore, but in reality Russia’s aggression is an attack on the values of freedom that R2P stands for, that is, universal human rights. To protect Ukraine to protect the freedom of people to choose their way, their foreign policy and international orientation.
What is the significance of the Nordic Defense Cooperation’s recent commitment to a shared security concept, and how might this affect NATO’s strategy in Northern Europe?
With Finland and Sweden in NATO many new opportunities for inter-Nordic defense cooperation have opened up. Air forces and ground forces interact daily to promote close coordination. But all this is happening under the umbrella of NATO, under NATO systems, power structure and command and control. There is no Nordic strategy or independent concept in this, but rather efforts to coordinate regional forces into a unified force within NATO. That said, new initiatives such as the Joint Air Operations Center, the new Army Multi Corps Headquarters, and other new structures, clearly reflect the renewed interest in defense cooperation.
Joining Sweden and Finland strengthens NATO significantly and improves the defense of northern Norway, but also Sweden and Finland (that’s why they joined). NATO has a northwesterly system, one of the three NATO defense systems. It requires new thinking at least about the supply, and supply to these countries, through Norway and the Baltic Sea. NATO must organize all this.
To what extent is Norwegian defense policy influenced by Norwegian identity and values?
I think that every country’s defense policy is influenced by its own identity and values - including Norway. We are partly built on the painful experience of work during the Second World War (that’s why we are a founding member of NATO), but also a country with little national identity, which means a history of bridge building, dialogue, and trade. rather than winning and playing power. The Norwegian embargo by the Soviet Union and now Russia is now banned, by reducing the military presence near Russia to avoid “provocation” or escalation of conflicts. This is directly connected to our identity and the story of “1000 years of peaceful relations” with Russia. You can construct and question this axiom, but nevertheless it continues to play a role in Norwegian security policy circles.
What developments might support integration around Nordic defence? What key changes would be needed to make this happen?
Nordic defense integration is a function of NATO membership. Depending on the details of NATO’s defense systems, command structure and power structure, opportunities for closer Nordic cooperation and integration emerge. If, for example, Finland establishes a Forward Land Force unit in its territory, with Sweden as the lead country, others, including Denmark and Norway, may also contribute. Similarly, when NATO agreed to establish a Joint Air Operations Center in Norway, this provided opportunities for air forces to work more closely together. Some of these initiatives come from the branches themselves, others are the result of NATO processes or at the political and strategic level.
I think we will end up with one de-facto military, even if it is still under national or NATO control. In a country the forces will be national, but the Area of Responsibility (AOR) may cross national borders, and all will be under the joint Division and Corps HQ. However, it is important not only to think about the Nordics, but also to include the major powers involved in the region, especially the United States and the United Kingdom. All the structures mentioned – as well as other programs – must involve key partners.
Do you feel that the Nordic response to the war in Ukraine is sufficient?
The Nordics and the Baltics have given a lot of support to Ukraine. But I fear that more is needed, especially in the short term. I think 2025 will be an important year, and Ukraine can win if we strengthen our defense – not reduce it, as we (the West) did between 2023 and 24. Especially my country, with its huge petroleum profits, invested much, much more in Ukraine than today. Among the Nordics we offer the least, both in real numbers and per GDP. It is really urgent for the government to invest, not least in the Ukrainian defense industry. Success will be inevitable.
How do you assess the Nordic countries’ relations with major powers such as the US, Russia, and China?
All the Nordics have strong bilateral agreements with the US in addition to NATO. This is important, because no other partner has the resources to help in the event of a major conflict. They will want to keep these regardless of who is in the White House. Russia is a country with which no Nordic country can have a meaningful dialogue. This will remain so as long as Putin is in power. China is very mixed. The Nordics follow the language of the EU and NATO in China and try to de-risk, but not isolate. Trading in unsecured assets will continue. But Sweden for example, has significant Chinese investments (like Volvo) that cannot be moved like that.
What is the most important piece of advice you would give to young International Relations scholars?
Read the classics! Not just in IR, but also in sociology. Also read about the theory and philosophy of science. But stay in tune with the world around you. Nobody cares about introvert quasi-philosophical IR theory arguments. Use theories and classics as you see fit to better analyze empirical phenomena. But don’t overcomplicate it. Enjoy it!
Further Studies in E-International Relations
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