How Syrian rebel leader Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani reinvented himself

Syrian rebel leader Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani has denied that his name is associated with his jihadist group, and has been using his real name, Ahmed al-Sharaa, in official documents issued since Thursday, before the fall of President Bashar al-Assad .

The move is part of Jawlani’s efforts to strengthen his legitimacy in the new situation, as his Islamist terrorist group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which leads other rebels, announced the capture of the Syrian capital, Damascus, to consolidate its control. most of the country.

Jawlani’s transformation is not recent, but has been carefully cultivated over the years, visible not only in his public statements and negotiations with international companies but also in his evolving appearance.

Once dressed in jihadist military garb, he has adopted a Western-style wardrobe over the years. Now, as he leads the raiding party, he is wearing military fatigues, reflecting his role as an operations room commander.

But who is Jawlani – or Ahmed al-Sharaa – and why and how has he changed?

A 2021 PBS interview with Jawlani revealed that he was born in 1982 in Saudi Arabia, where his father worked as an oil engineer until 1989.

That year, the Jawlani family returned to Syria, where he grew up and lived in the Mezzeh area of ​​Damascus.

Jawlani’s journey as a jihadist began in Iraq, linked with al-Qaeda through the predecessor of the Islamic State (IS) group – al-Qaeda in Iraq, later, with the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).

After the 2003 US-led invasion, he joined other foreign fighters in Iraq and, in 2005, was imprisoned at Camp Bucca, where he developed his jihadist connections and was later introduced to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the silent scholar who would over time. continue to lead IS.

In 2011, Baghdadi sent Jawlani to Syria with funds to establish al-Nusra Front, an underground group tied to the ISI. By 2012, Nusra had become Syria’s most prominent militia, hiding its ties to IS and al-Qaeda.

Tensions erupted in 2013 when Baghdadi’s group in Iraq unilaterally announced the merger of two groups (ISI and Nusra), announcing the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS), and revealing the links for the first time. between them.

Jawlani refused, because he wanted to distance his party from the violent tactics of the ISI, which led to a split.

To get out of that sticky situation, Jawlani pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, making the Nusra Front its Syrian branch.

From the beginning, he prioritized winning the support of the Syrian people, distancing himself from the brutality of IS and emphasizing a rational approach to jihad.

In April 2013, al-Nusra Front became an affiliate of al-Qaeda in Syria, leading to a conflict with IS.

Although Jawlani’s move was partly an attempt to maintain local support and avoid alienating Syrians from the rebels, the al-Qaeda affiliate ultimately did little to help the effort.

It was a big challenge in 2015 when Nusra and other groups captured Idlib province, forcing them to cooperate in its administration.

In 2016, Jawlani severed ties with al-Qaeda, renaming the group as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and later as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in 2017.

Although it seems superficial at first, the split reveals a deeper divide. Al-Qaeda accused Jawlani of treason, leading to the defection and establishment of Hurras al-Din, a new al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, HTS later crushed him in 2020. Members of Hurras al-Din, however, remained there to guard the region.

HTS has also targeted IS operatives and foreign fighters in Idlib, dismantling their networks and forcing others into “deradicalisation” programmes.

These moves, which were hailed as efforts to consolidate forces and reduce fighting, reflected Jawlani’s strategy to position HTS as a major and powerful political force in Syria.

Despite the public split with al-Qaeda and name change, HTS has continued to be designated by the UN, US, UK and other countries as a terrorist organization, and the US has maintained a $10m reward for information on Jawlani’s whereabouts. The West sees the separation as a facade.

Under Jawlani, HTS has become the strongest force in Idlib, the main rebel stronghold in northwestern Syria and home to around four million people, most of whom were displaced from other Syrian provinces.

To address concerns about the terrorist group ruling the area, HTS established a civilian army, the so-called “Syrian Salvation Government” (SG) in 2017 as its political and administrative arm.

The SG operated as a state, with a prime minister, ministers and local departments overseeing sectors such as education, health and reconstruction, while maintaining a religious council led by Sharia, or Islamic law.

To rebuild his image, Jawlani became involved in the community, visiting displacement camps, attending events, and directing relief efforts, especially during crises such as the 2023 earthquake.

HTS has highlighted achievements in governance and infrastructure to enable its legislation and demonstrate its ability to provide stability and services.

It has previously praised the Taliban, when they return to power in 2021, praising them as an inspiration and a model for successfully balancing jihadist efforts with political ambitions, including making strategic compromises to achieve their goals.

Jawlani’s efforts in Idlib reflected his broader strategy to demonstrate HTS’s ability not only to lead jihad but also to govern effectively.

By prioritizing stability, public services and reconstruction, he aimed to show Idlib as a model of success under the HTS regime, enhancing both his party’s legitimacy and his political ambitions.

But under his leadership, HTS has crushed and marginalized other opposition groups, jihadists and rebels, in its bid to consolidate its power and dominate the scene.

More than a year before the HTS-led attack on November 27, Jawlani faced protests in Idlib from hardline Islamists and Syrian activists.

Critics have compared his rule to Assad’s, accusing HTS of tyranny, suppressing dissent and silencing critics. Protesters called the HTS security forces “Shabbiha”, a term used to describe Assad’s loyal supporters.

They also alleged that HTS deliberately avoided fighting government forces and displaced jihadists and foreign fighters in Idlib to prevent them from engaging in such actions, all to appease international actors.

Even during the latest offensive, activists have insisted that HTS release people detained in Idlib for allegedly dissidents.

In response to these criticisms, HTS has initiated several reforms over the past year. It disbanded or renamed a controversial security force accused of human rights violations and established a “Complaints Department” to allow citizens to file complaints against the group. Its critics say the measures are just a show to contain dissent.

Confirming its consolidation of power in Idlib and suppression of pluralism among militant groups, HTS said that unity under a single leadership is essential to making progress and ultimately overthrowing the Syrian government.

HTS and its civilian arm, SG, have walked a tightrope, striving to project a modern, moderate image to win over the local population and the international community, while at the same time maintaining an Islamic identity to appease hardliners in rebel-held areas and HTS ranks .

For example, in December 2023, HTS and SG clashed after a “festival” in a shiny new shopping mall was criticized by ministers as “immoral”.

And this August, an event inspired by the Paralympic Games drew heavy criticism from hardliners, prompting the SG to review the organization of such events.

These events illustrate the challenges HTS faces in reconciling the expectations of its Islamist base with the broader demands of the Syrian people, who are seeking freedom and coexistence after years of brutal rule under Assad.

As the latest attack unfolded, global media focused on Jawlani’s jihadist past, prompting some rebel supporters to tell him to back down, viewing him as a criminal.

Although he has previously expressed his willingness to disband his party and step aside, his recent actions and public appearances tell a different story.

HTS’s success in mobilizing rebels and nearly capturing the entire country in less than two weeks has strengthened Jawlani’s position, silencing hardline critics and suspicions of opportunism.

Jawlani and SG have convinced local and international audiences.

To the Syrians, including the minors, they promised safety; to neighbors and powers like Russia, they promise peaceful relations. Jawlani even assured Russia that its bases in Syria would remain unharmed if the attacks stopped.

The change reflects HTS’ “moderate jihad” strategy since 2017, emphasizing pragmatism over radical ideology.

Jawlani’s approach may reflect the decline of global jihad movements such as IS and al-Qaeda, whose inflexibility is often seen as ineffective and unsustainable.

His path may encourage other groups to adapt, marking a new era of politically flexible “jihadism” or just a temporary departure from traditionalism for political and territorial gains.