Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in 1994. Now it asks why

Under a heavy gray sky and thin snow, gray and green relics recall the Soviet Union’s past.

Missiles, explosives and vehicles stand as reminders of the era when Ukraine played a key role in the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons program – its last line of defense.

Beneath the slightly raised concrete lid and lid of the silo, a large intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) peeks out.

But the arrow is like an icon, cracked and moldy. For almost 30 years, the silo has been full of debris.

The entire nascent site, near the central Ukrainian city of Pervomais’k, has long been turned into a museum.

As newly independent Ukraine emerged from Moscow’s shadow in the early 1990s, Kyiv turned its back on nuclear weapons.

But nearly three years after Russia’s full-scale invasion, and with no clear agreement between the allies on how to ensure Ukraine’s security when the war ends, many now feel that was a mistake.

Thirty years ago, on December 5, 1994, at a ceremony in Budapest, Ukraine joined Belarus and Kazakhstan in donating nuclear weapons in return for security guarantees from the United States, the UK, France, China and Russia.

Strictly speaking, these missiles belonged to the Soviet Union, not its newly independent republics.

But a third of the USSR’s nuclear arsenal was on Ukrainian soil, and handing over weapons was considered an important moment, worthy of international recognition.

“Promises about security confirm that [we] we have given to these three nations… they emphasize our commitment to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of these states,” said US President Bill Clinton in Budapest.

A young graduate of a military academy in Kharkiv, Oleksandr Sushchenko arrived in Pervomais’k two years later, just as the demilitarization process was beginning.

He watched as arrows were fired and bunkers were blown up.

He is now back on base as one of the museum’s curators.

When he looks back after a decade of misery caused by Russia, which the international community seemed unable or unwilling to stop, he reaches an inescapable conclusion.

He says: “Seeing what is happening now in Ukraine, my personal opinion is that it was a mistake to destroy all nuclear weapons.

“But it was politics. The senior leadership has made a decision and we are doing just that.”

At the time, everything seemed to make sense. No one thought that Russia would invade Ukraine within 20 years.

“We were naive, but we also had hope,” said Serhiy Komisarenko, who served as Ukraine’s ambassador to London in 1994.

He says: “When Britain and the United States and then France joined, we thought it was enough, you know. And also in Russia. “

In a poor country, just emerging from decades of Soviet rule, the idea of ​​maintaining expensive nuclear weapons was absurd.

“Why use money to make nuclear weapons or to maintain them,” said Komisarenko, “if you can use it for industry, to prosper?”

But the calamitous anniversary of the 1994 accord is now being used by Ukraine to make a point.

Appearing at a NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels this week, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andriy Sybiha presented a green folder containing a copy of the Budapest Memorandum.

“This document failed to protect Ukrainian and transatlantic security,” he said. “We must avoid repeating such mistakes.”

A statement from his ministry called the Memorandum “a reminder of the misunderstandings in security decision-making”.

The question now, for Ukraine and its allies, is to find another way to ensure national security.

For President Volodymyr Zelensky, the answer has long been clear.

“Safety guarantees are the best for us [with] Nato,” he said on Sunday.

“For us, NATO and the EU are not negotiable.”

Despite Zelensky’s insistence that only membership of the Western alliance can ensure Ukraine’s survival against its larger, more aggressive neighbor, it is clear that Nato members are still divided on the issue.

In the face of opposition from several members, the coalition said that so far Ukraine’s path to eventual membership is “irreversible”, without setting a timetable.

At the moment, all the talk among Ukraine’s allies is “peace with strength”. to ensure that Ukraine is in the strongest position possible before possible peace talks, led by Donald Trump, sometime next year.

“If our military support for Ukraine is stronger now, their hand will be stronger at the negotiating table,” Nato Secretary General Mark Rutte said on Tuesday.

As we are uncertain what Donald Trump’s approach to Ukraine will be, key suppliers of military aid, including the US and Germany, are sending major new supplies to Ukraine before he takes office.

Looking ahead, some in Ukraine suggest that a country determined to defend itself cannot rule out a return to nuclear weapons, especially when its most important ally, the United States, may prove unreliable in the near future.

Last month, officials denied reports that a Defense Department paper suggested a simple nuclear device could be built within months.

It is clear that it is not in the plans now, but Alina Frolova, the former Deputy Minister of Defense, says that the leak may not have been an accident.

“Apparently that is an option that is being discussed in Ukraine, among experts,” he said.

“If we ever see that we don’t have support and we’re losing this war and we need to protect our people … I believe that would be an option.”

It’s hard to see nuclear weapons returning anytime soon to the frozen wasteland outside of Pervomais’k.

Only one of the foundation’s 30m-deep silos remains intact, preserved as it was when it was completed in 1979.

It is a very strong building, built to withstand a nuclear attack, with heavy steel doors and underground tunnels connecting it to the entire base.

In a small, cramped basement control room, accessible by an even tighter lift, coded orders to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles would have been received, interpreted and executed.

Former missile specialist Oleksandr Sushchenko shows how two operators would turn a key and press a button (gray, not red), before playing a Hollywood-style video simulation of the world’s biggest nuclear exchange.

It’s a bit comical, but also deeply sobering.

Eliminating the largest ICBMs, Oleksandr says, clearly makes sense. By the mid-1990s, America was no longer the enemy.

But Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal also included a variety of tactical weapons, with ranges between 100 and 1,000km.

Oleksandr says: “As it happened, the enemy was very close.

“We could save a few tactical battles. That would ensure security in our country.”