The 2024 student uprising in Bangladesh stands as a pivotal moment in the country’s political history, with the ouster of Sheikh Hasina’s government marking the end of years of growing discontent. This movement, however, raised a serious question: can Hasina’s party, the Bangladesh Awami League, with its philosophy of Bengali nationalism and nationalism, find a way to be redeemed and reconciled in the new political environment? The answer to this question depends on whether the revolution is understood as a collective language based on ideals such as democracy and pluralism, or as a movement driven by a single, pragmatic goal—the removal of a dictatorship.
If we argue that the revolution was supported by a unified language of democracy and pluralism, then reconciling the Awami League becomes a much more difficult task. Bengali nationalism and patriotism, the two pillars on which the Awami League has long rested, are not inherently inclusive in the way they are politically integrated. The party has used these philosophies to create strong binaries in the political arena, dividing many people into ‘Pro-Liberation’ and ‘anti-Liberation’ camps, a tactic that marginalizes dissenting voices under the guise of protecting national unity and national values. The collective language of insurgency, if indeed it follows democracy and pluralism, directly challenges this binary by offering an alternative vision of collective and shared political participation. In this regard, the reconciliation between the participants of this protest and the Awami League seems irreversible without a fundamental change of its political identity.
One of the main arguments for the difficulty of reconciliation lies in the great difference of opinion between the Awami League’s ahistorical politics and the pluralistic tendencies that would explain the rebellion if we accept the basis of a unified language. The Awami League has long positioned itself as the sole guardian of Bangladesh’s national identity, using the country’s malaise as a tool to suppress Islamist dissent or opposition political forces. But a collective language based on pluralism would reject this collective national identity, including a more open and abstract view of political and cultural belonging. The plurality involved in this revolution will mean the rejection of the narrative that has supported the Awami League’s political dominance for decades. For the Awami League to be used in such a context would require the party to abandon the foundation of its identity—a very difficult task for a political party deeply rooted in the historical and ideological soil of post-independence Bangladesh.
Moreover, the perceived opposition of the Awami League has been highly contested in recent years, as the party has relied heavily on proxy tactics and active relations with Islamist forces to maintain its hold on power. The language of this demonstration which is intended to be a democratic collective and its majority will expose this hypocrisy, and alienate the party from any attempts at reconciliation. The movement’s call for democratic reforms and the restoration of civil liberties will run counter to the Awami League’s recent record of repression and co-optation, making it difficult for the party to regain the trust of many people who now see diversity as important. part of the nation’s future.
However, if we reject the idea of a unified language and instead say that the uprising of 2024 was driven by a single, unified goal – the removal of the government led by Sheikh Hasina – then the chances of redemption and reconciliation of the Awami League improve. In this interpretation, the movement is not seen as an intellectual revolt against the fundamentals of the Awami League’s identity but as a rational response to an authoritarian regime that has outgrown its welcome. Here the focus is on regime change, not on the rejection of Bengali nationalism or disbelief. By organizing the revolution along party lines, the Awami League can position itself as a victim of the situation rather than a target of ideological subversion.
The main difference between these two definitions lies in the depth of organizational criticism. A movement based on a collective language would effectively contradict the core philosophies of the Awami League, making reconciliation impossible unless the party undergoes a deep ideological shift. In contrast, a single-minded movement to oust the government allows the Awami League to maintain its ideological coherence, as it accepts responsibility for the political failure that led to its downfall. Redemption, in this case, becomes a matter of political strategy and leadership change, rather than a complete rejection of the party’s historical role in shaping Bangladesh’s identity.
After these riots, the task of the Awami League, if it is to remain important in the political future of Bangladesh, is to reconcile with a society that has been disillusioned by its recent rule. This reconciliation will be much easier if we argue that the revolution was driven by a common goal rather than a common language. Focusing on regime change allows the Awami League to reclaim its ideological mantle, position itself as a reformist party and revitalize itself in the face of political adversity. This approach will require the party to engage in a process of self-examination, acknowledging the authoritarian excesses of the past decade while reaffirming its commitment to Bengali nationalism and anti-nationalism in an inclusive, inclusive manner.
Therefore, the possibility of aligning the future of the Awami League with the Bangladesh envisioned revolution of 2024 depends on the story we choose to tell. If the rebellion is remembered as a collective language, the philosophical gap between the Awami League and the movement will remain too wide to bridge. Use will only be available if the group redefines its identity. However, if insurgency is understood as a successful mission, the Awami League can find a way to reform and adapt, without abandoning the philosophical foundations on which its legacy is built. The question of whether Bangladesh’s political future will be shaped by language or objectives will define the path of reconciliation in the coming years.
Further Studies in E-International Relations
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