Rebel Rule in the Middle East
Edited by Ibrahim Fraihat and Abdalhadi Alijla
Palgrave Macmillan Singapore2023
Unlike other overlapping fields, such as social organization studies, which are characterized by western-centric history, the field of revolutionary governance was started by pioneers in non-western cases (Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015; Mampilly 2011). However, with notable exceptions, including some contributors to this volume (Schwab 2018; Furlan 2022), the Middle East has been underrepresented in this field. Accordingly, the edited volume by Fraihat and Alijla is a welcome and original attempt to address this geographical gap in the field, especially due to the significant presence of many armed groups of various different ideologies throughout the region.
The volume begins with a well-coordinated introduction by the two co-editors, although the first page’s contention that rebel governance is an understudied topic seems hard to justify. Recent years have seen numerous monographs in top university presses as well as special issues and individual articles in highly regarded journals. Although one may question the theoretical and artistic desirability of this wide-ranging effect, rebel governance undoubtedly took root in mainstream conflict research (see Teiner 2022). It is commendable that the volume includes many authors from the region and, more importantly, contributions from research institutions in the region, adding local knowledge to the field that is often absent from outside western analysis of conflicts in the Middle East.
Geographically, the book includes three cases from Syria, two dealing with the governance efforts of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and one looking at the provision of services and legitimacy in Kurdish-dominated areas of Northern Syria. One looks at the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon and another chapter looks at the emergence of Iranian-backed militias in Iraq and how their presence undermines state institutions. One chapter that attempts a comparative assessment across state borders looks at the use of propaganda for rebel rule by ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Furlan’s theoretically powerful chapter examines the role of ideology in the implementation of rebel governance during the two periods of Al-Qaida’s rule in Yemen, thus providing a historical, case-by-case comparison. The chapter on Afghanistan, which can often be classified as a Middle Eastern country, looks at the critical importance of the Taliban’s relationship with its supporting region. Other chapters include a focus on tribalism in Libya, how Hamas has used governance to consolidate power in Palestine, and a final contribution looks from an interdisciplinary perspective to the reach of international criminal governance in the cases of Hezbollah and ISIS.
There are several outstanding chapters that will make a significant contribution to our field. Grant-Brook’s argument about collaboration with insurgents and the blurred boundaries between armed groups, state, and local officials is well-supported and convincingly illustrated. Schwab’s chapter on competitive rebel governance builds on his earlier work and is conceptually ambitious, drawing theoretical insights from empirical cases rather than importing existing models of rebel governance and testing them in the Middle Eastern context. It is unfortunate that these two chapters are not connected, as there would have been a wider range of relevant information because they look at different stages in the chronological order of the emergence of HTS/Jabhat al-Nusrah. Furlan’s chapter is one of the few that references other chapters in the volume and presents findings that will resonate beyond discussions of rebel governance in the region. Ezbidi’s study of Hamas’s rule in Gaza examines its ambiguous role as both a government and an opposition movement, artfully weaving together literature on governance and rebel rule. Al-Aloosy and Bakir’s other chapters were very informative and interesting to read but they did not interact in any fashion with the literature on the regime of the revolutionaries and met the high level, long-read forms of journalism rather than academic texts.
As is almost inevitable with organized collections, there is some degree of inconsistency throughout the volume. Some of the chapters are written in an academic style, but most do not involve discussion of data or methods, dealing poorly with the literature on rebel governance. One of the strengths of this volume is the widespread background and local knowledge of many of the authors, but this also presents some challenges; language editing was not inclusive of certain chapters, which could harm students’ ability to fully engage with the content. This, however, is more a reflection of the publisher’s involvement in the publishing process than the efforts of the authors themselves.
As someone who works for the Kurdish armed forces, although not in Syria, Alijla’s chapter on Qamishli’s governance and legitimacy stands out for many reasons. It is based on the highly controversial premise that the history of the Kurds in Syria shows that visible coexistence was possible. This view of “Syria for all” (p.43) undermines the denial of mass citizenship to the Kurds during the Assad regime, Arabization policies, and the great dissatisfaction of the Kurds with this “Syria for all” as evidenced by the Qamishli uprising in 2004. . Although the author can reasonably question the non-state or post-state views of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) (see for example, Leezenberg 2016), one can argue that the PYD’s claims that it does not want to include a separate state in the region. medium-term strategy to mobilize support before the next state campaign is launched. But to simply ignore the fact that the PYD and its allies clearly reject the state as their goal, is problematic. Especially if, thanks to its decentralized governance model, it allows other ethnic and religious communities to govern themselves, in contrast to the centralizing tendencies of the Assad regime.
In summary, this book makes a significant contribution to understanding the processes of rebel governance in communities and conflicts that have previously been neglected in this field. It has helped to consolidate a broader agenda about rebel rule in the Middle East that goes beyond a focus on the virtues of Islam. I have no doubt that it will be widely cited and I hope that it has laid the groundwork for a more ambitious understanding not only of rebel regimes in the Middle East but of rebel groups around the world.
References
Arjona, A., Kasfir, N. and Mampilly, Z. (eds) (2015) Civil War Rebel Rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Furlan, M. (2022) ‘State Fragility, al-Qa’ida, and Rebel Governance: Yemen from the Arab Spring to 2022’, The Middle East Journal76(1), pp. 9-28.
Leezenberg, M. (2016) ‘The ambiguity of democratic autonomy: Kurdish movements in Turkey and Rojava’, Studies in Southeast Europe and the Black Sea16(4), pp. 671-690. doi: 10.1080/14683857.2016.1246529.
Mampilly, ZC (2011) Rebel Rulers: Rebel Rule and Civil Life in Wartime. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Schwab, R. (2018) ‘Rebel courts in civil wars: three (re)formations in contemporary Syria (2012–2017)’, Small Wars and Rebellions29(4), pp. 801-826.
Teiner, D. (2022) ‘Revolutionary governance: a vibrant field of research,’ Zeitschrift Für Politikwissenschaft32(3), pp. 747-766.
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